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Abstract 
A framework is developed for understanding what is “taken for granted” both 
in philosophy and in life generally, which may serve to orient philosophical 
inquiry and make it more effective. The framework takes in language and its 
development, as well as mathematics, logic, and the empirical sphere with 
particular reference to the exigencies of life. It is evaluated through consider-
ation of seven philosophical issues concerned with such topics as solipsism, 
sense data as the route to knowledge, the possible reduction of geometry to 
logic, and the existence and status of human rights. Various dichotomies and 
the notion of continuity are evidently highly strategic. 
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1. Introduction 
The project of this paper is to delineate a structure for what is “taken for 
granted” in philosophical inquiry and by making that form explicit thereby fur-
ther the philosophical enterprise; in this connection, consideration is given to 
the treatment of seven philosophical issues. As a way into the topic attention 
may usefully be drawn to two disjunctions: that between philosophical work and 
how philosophers lead their lives, and that within philosophical inquiry between 
that which is being examined and that which is taken as given. Consider, for in-
stance, the not unfamiliar point that philosophising can involve seeming incon-
sistencies or even hypocrisies. In their ordinary lives sceptical philosophers, like 
others, speak in the vernacular and make the everyday distinctions between the 
known and the unknown (Baldwin, 2011: p. 553). Wittgenstein made the sharp 
remark that, “Those philosophers who have denied the existence of Matter have 
not wished to deny that under my trousers I wear pants” (quoted Wisdom, 1942: 
p. 431). On a related but different point, it is often remarked in connection with 
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philosophical inquiry that while one element is being explored certain other 
elements are assumed or—at any rate temporarily—being taken as given. In a 
philosophical context, doubting one item presupposes confidence in others; a 
project of doubting everything degenerates into a failure convincingly to doubt 
anything (Wittgenstein, 1969: Paragraph 115). Important logical or conceptual 
issues are involved, for doubts need to be grounded, with the grounds being 
constituted by beliefs which are not in doubt (Baldwin, 2011: p. 558). 
A further—familiar—way of putting it is to say that the possibility of mistakes 
and doubts presupposes adherence to a “picture of the world”, but Wittgenstein 
goes further by identifying assertions—even common-sense truisms—as “privi-
leged starting points which we rely on in making sense of our experience” 
(Baldwin, 2011: p. 558). He introduces a helpful metaphor: “That is to say, the 
questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some proposi-
tions are exempt from doubt, are as it were hinges on which those turn” (Witt-
genstein, 1969: Paragraph 341; Pritchard, 2011: p. 530). In going further he con-
nects some “hinge” propositions to our “natural” dispositions and to our animal 
nature. His point here is that life is conducted on the basis of practices within 
which language and behaviour are integrated for the achievement of practical 
goals which brings in a presumption of certainty; since uncertainty could not 
lead to action. Perhaps this is going too far because we often proceed on the ba-
sis of a combination of hope and expectation, but then, of course, no doubt there 
would be other matters taken for granted or—temporally at least—taken as giv-
en. At least one is alerted to the way in which issues of doubt and certainty “play 
out” differently in philosophical as against practical contexts. In this connection 
Wittgenstein has employed the notion of differing language games but that can 
leave one uneasy because within a “way of life” contexts are not totally divorced 
and language games connect up: it is not as though one is talking about draughts 
and chess. 
This article is stimulated by these kinds of observations and particularly by the 
content of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (Shanker, 1986), although—in all hones-
ty—it is pretty certain that it would not find favour with that author, given that 
its direction of travel is towards “systematising”. A jumping off point is provided 
by the notion of hinge statements and matters “taken for granted” in life gener-
ally and in philosophy. Is it possible—one may ask—to delineate a structure for 
the “given” or “taken for granted”? It is evident, for instance, that in identifiable 
contexts some considerations are logically prior to others, in which case there 
may be even greater danger that they are taken as given rather than scrutinised. 
The most obvious case is that of language itself which, as Bertrand Russell com-
mented, for an extended period he (even he!) rather assumed to be a “neutral” 
window on the world, thus leaving him open to misapprehensions. Above one 
implicitly apologised for this article being systematising and a further apology is 
due: each section of it is abbreviated—short and partial. This is almost inevitable 
given its very broad scope but brevity may at least have the merit that the direc-
tion of travel may become clearer. Picking up on the significance of Russell’s 
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remark, initial attention is directed at language; consideration is then give to the 
nature of “what is the case” taking in the empirical, contingent sphere as well as 
mathematics and logic, with a concentration on the former. The significance is 
then evaluated of the fact that language originated in time and “evolved”, in the 
sense of developed continuously; then—noting Wittgenstein’s (informal) refer-
ence to our natural dispositions and animal nature—a further section is con-
cerned with the way in which language is shaped by the exigencies of life. In an 
attempt to alleviate the pressure of that philosopher’s stern gaze there follows a 
consideration of how various philosophical questions may be treated which it is 
hoped demonstrates some strengths of a structured approach. 
2. Language 
Language is the ubiquitous element; it is like air seemingly everywhere available 
and penetrating into the most intimate parts. Language flows, sometimes in tiny 
rivulets, sometimes in oceanic currents. It is meaningful or at least it often makes 
sense but sometimes does not. It can even sometimes seem a bit mad but, if this is 
madness, then “there is method in it”. It seems that certain things are “allowed” 
in it, others not. “Allowed” is doubly pertinent because language is “moody”. It 
is sometimes insistent, even seemingly dictatorial, but also sometimes reassur-
ing; doubt may be felt but may also be dispelled; language may be lyrical but, on 
the other hand, it sometimes comes across as neutral.  
Sometimes things happen, sometimes not; sometimes things may happen, 
sometimes not. It seems the second of these pairs (“may” and “may not”) are not 
infrequently found together. There is sometimes a sense that things are going on, 
or more fully, that they have gone on, or are going on or will go on; there is a 
sense that “going on” is between “have gone on” and “will go on”. “Doing” is 
important in language. Sometimes something is done to something else; some-
times it is done to itself; sometimes it is just done. 
Language contains a dramatis personae, including “I”, “you”, “he”, “she”, “it”; 
although one must be alert to the fact that in this drama “I” may sometimes 
seem quickly to transmute into “you” and vice versa. Two other characters with 
the same tendency are “this” and “that”. There can be a “sense of direction” as 
“I” does something to “you”; there may also be a sense of direction towards 
“this” and “that”. 
The reader will already have concluded that the last three paragraphs are 
partly intended, in a Brechtian manner, to generate a “distancing effect” from 
what is highly familiar so that its role may be less “taken for granted” and there-
fore conceptualised in a more challenging way. Given its significance later on, it 
is worth particularly picking out the (indexical) use of “I” associated with the 
personal and the individual, which at first glance takes one away from what is 
shared, but every aspect of which is governed by linguistic convention; however 
private or personal a topic, language may probe there. There are other aspects 
beside the linguistic which may suffer the fate of being taken “as given”. 
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3. What Is the Case? 
To proceed further, it behoves one to consider “what is the case”; assertions 
about this are understood to be true or false. Communication within a commu-
nity takes many forms, for instance a request for help, an instruction, an order, 
or a compliment, and is integrated into a way of life. However, given our materi-
al existence and interdependence with an environment, of particular importance 
is language addressed to the conditions of human activity or “what is the case”. 
The relation between language and “what is the case” is what is being analysed in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The two main types of assertions 
to consider are empirical and mathematical propositions: for instance: “there is 
snow at the Antarctic”; “2 × 2 = 4”. In what follows one is somewhat more con-
cerned with the empirical sphere but mathematics and logic must be situated.  
In short, logic and mathematics mediate between language and “what is the 
case”, while being able to claim membership of both categories. Conventionally, 
people are maximally confident or “certain” about mathematical results, but, on 
the other hand, perusal of mathematical works reveals they consist of a series of 
sentences and figures. There is point to the familiar remark that “mathematics is 
a language”; at one level it may be construed as a specialised extension of ordi-
nary language. Hence it may be said to have a dual character i.e. as language and 
as “what is the case”. That logic and mathematics are close is suggested by the 
observation that mathematics consists of accurate reasoning, i.e. it has logic as 
its basic underlying element (which in itself would imply, in conventional terms, 
that logic must be “at least as certain” as mathematics). On the other hand, the 
previous section was given its Brechtian character partly to point up that logic is 
integral to basic uses of language, such as the idea that the present is “between” 
the past and the future, and the way we employ modality.  
As Kant and Wittgenstein particularly help to make clear, logic is basic to the 
conceptualisation of the empirical sphere. It is at the root of key concepts and 
frameworks employed such as time, space, and causality (Pertinent here are a 
priori notions, identified by Kant, which though they may be elicited by expe-
rience, may be understood to have a basis other than experience; geometry spe-
cifically is considered in a section below). With respect to time and distance, the 
uses of “later than” and “further than” respectively may be characterised as tran-
sitive. Logic incorporates a structure of rules (some grammatical in nature) for 
making meaningful assertions which may be judged true or false. Hard precisely 
to pin down, in Wittgenstein’s judgement logic is not a theory nor reflects the 
world (Wittgenstein, 1922: 6.13) but its propositions “are tautologies” (Witt-
genstein, 1922: 6.12) (see also Black, 1964). 
This is pertinent as one proceeds to focus on the empirical sphere. An initial 
purpose is to clarify that “what is the case” incorporates not just what we con-
sider to be everyday states of affairs but also observation of them; also to draw 
attention to the point that observers are in a certain sense “replaceable”. A se-
lected example concerns there being an electric blanket on a particular bed. 
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Suppose someone says: “there is an electric-blanket on my bed but no-one else 
sees or knows it”. That person may be sensitive to their privacy, but it is unders-
tood that were anyone else to be placed in the same position they too could see it 
and know that it is there. Importantly, instances where people gain knowledge 
through observation or through other senses are themselves understood as situa-
tions which are knowable from a general point of view. In principle, all instances 
of observation or communication about it are themselves knowable.  
Following on from this, quite reasonably there is a tendency to equate a “state 
of affairs” with what is “knowable” but it must be appreciated that the word 
“know” is used in a variety of ways (Wittgenstein, 1969: Paragraphs 330, 357, 
379-380, 424, 483-484; “you can rely on it”, Paragraph 561) and here one is con-
cerned with knowing in the limiting sense where one can only be said to know 
something that is indeed the case. That which is knowable in this way may be 
referred to as (potentially) a “state of affairs” or fact. 
Hence there are innumerable examples where what is the case could be said to 
be “publicly observable” i.e. anyone could in principle be so placed as to be able 
to confirm it. Importantly, language also refers to events which are not publicly 
observable in this way, such as the feeling of pain or occurrence of thoughts or 
an instance of memory recall. In this connection attention is often drawn to the 
point that these are hard for other people to verify. Yet, importantly, it is not 
doubted that someone could be in pain or could be thinking about something; 
this logically relates to the point that assertions on these matters are treated as 
potentially true or false. Hence language makes clear that these types of occur-
rences—sometimes referred to as “subjective states”—are real enough i.e. that 
someone feeling a pain is potentially as much a fact—or state of affairs—as 
someone sitting on a bus. So too does language readily embrace phenomena 
where there is participation of the mental in the physical as with blushing or a 
smile. 
4. The Continuity of Language 
Now language only evolves gradually—it changes continuously—and to under-
stand its role it pays to take account of origins and antecedents. Humans evolved 
from other primates and one can speculate about aspects of the origins of lan-
guage, but do so responsibly. Although we now know about an immense un-
iverse, the origins of language would lie in the perspectives of the kinship groups 
of preliterate peoples. Very roughly there must have been a passage from an 
animal world of sensation (where sensations are “private”) through to a human 
grasp through language that existence is in “a world of objects” (where objects 
are “public”). To assist understanding of this transition in more biologically—or 
social psychologically-oriented terms, reference is made to a human capacity to 
operate with “theory of mind” or to “take the role of the other”, but in the 
present context it is pertinent to say that what is involved is people coming, for 
instance, to understand that they are viewing the same thing from the same 
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place. This understanding arises because, unlike animals, they are, through lan-
guage, able at least implicitly but sometimes explicitly to “compare notes” on 
experience. The world of objects is, besides language, the other main system the 
existence of which or form of which is taken for granted within certain types of 
philosophical discussion.  
The world of objects—the physical world—roughly speaking consists of the 
two overlapping classes of things we can use—potential resources—but also ob-
stacles or things we “come up against”. Human bodies are numbered among the 
physical objects. Indeed they are to be construed as an essential feature, a foun-
dational element of the physical world. This is to do with the fact that they nec-
essarily have the same object status as things with which they are in contact or 
“touch”. From the outset bodily differentiation is the primary way we are indi-
viduated as people. As regards the non-human aspect of the world it may follow 
from our evolutionary background that there is also early conceptualisation of 
animals as individual gestalts (rather than their individuality needing to be an 
integration of elements as in the way we understand a complex building); after 
all, they can be our food source and vice versa. 
As people are differentiated, actions may be attributed to them including lin-
guistic actions (analysable as distinguishable speech acts; Searle, 1969 and 2010); 
the source has physical location. There can also be cooperative sources. Many 
uses of speech are publicly observable. It is also the case, however, that it be-
comes possible to attribute private uses of language to people as their thoughts. 
There can be soliloquy which is in principle publicly observable but also mental 
activity which is not. Importantly, thoughts or memories, some of which are 
rendered in propositional form, do not have an intrinsic location, although the 
content of thought could include locational aspects. Their status as “his or her 
thoughts” conceptually links to individuality and is secured by the shared un-
derstanding that a person has physical location. 
Importantly too we do not just touch things but also lift them which is proba-
bly foundational in relation to the idea that an object has weight. There would be 
early grasp of the fact that a woman could lift her young child but not vice versa. 
Objects are things which cannot always be crammed into the same place but they 
may be able readily to occupy it successively—hence there is a source for a de-
veloping conception of space. It is the conception of space that is foundational in 
respect of geometry. From the earliest stage too there is experience of change 
within which context objects persist; so the conceptualisation of objects in their 
context is bound up with an incipient conceptualisation of time. The differentia-
tion of objects would also be foundational in respect of counting and the con-
ception of number. 
Plainly the last few paragraphs are indeed speculative but they are offered not 
as a definitive account but as pointing towards the kinds of considerations which 
bear upon the character of language. It is of the essence that language only de-
velops continuously: that which goes before is the only basis available for incre-
ments and innovations. It may well be the case that language could have taken 
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other directions but they are not as it were on offer to us today. We are familiar 
enough with the way individual languages develop slowly and continuously; so 
do the associated systems of ideas.  
5. Exigency 
Following on from a consideration of origins and basics, it is essential to take full 
account of the fact that, developing language usage—from the earliest stages 
through to the present—is shaped by the exigencies of life. One need hardly say 
that life sometimes takes the form of a desperate struggle. Language gets many of 
its basic senses and uses from a context of practical need rather than one of calm 
reflection. A basic point is that humans need to cooperate in order to sur-
vive—to gain access to the means of their own subsistence. The following re-
marks are again intended to be strategic but suggestive rather than exhaustive. A 
key idea is that we need to rely on one another. In short, people need to rely on 
circumstance and availability of means—especially in the form of other people. 
Plainly consideration of circumstance points to the use of the idea of truth or 
falsity. There are differing uses of language but where we rely on the under-
standing of a straightforward indicative assertion we are more likely to achieve 
our objectives should it prove to be true. The notion of promising or giving an 
assurance points rather in the same direction. Above reference was made to the 
use of the word “know”. Where people say they “know or know for sure”, it of-
ten smacks of giving an assurance, rather than simply offering a veridical record. 
In a basic way interrogative uses of language make it clear that sometimes 
something is being sought—and it may be urgent. Vocative and imperative uses 
of language are often geared to bringing about a desired state of affairs. 
Proceeding further, there are a set of locutions which bear upon issues, well 
known for their treatment by Hume, to do with induction and cause and effect. 
In practice human beings will often, with varying degrees of confidence, “repeat 
the dose”. For instance, one may return to a place to pick blackberries this year 
where many were to be found last year. Hence action is often governed by hope 
combined with expectation. We actually base our lives on all manner of ad hoc 
inductions no one of which would be “watertight” in a Humean sense, including 
that the Sun will rise tomorrow (although it should be added that in a modern 
context that particular expectation is made more secure by scientific theory). 
The notions of cause and effect are pretty basic in actual life, whatever prob-
lems they raise philosophically. Reverting to speculative anthropology, a possible 
source lies in the human ability to “produce” outcomes: as when an arrow is 
fired and a deer drops dead, an example which rather prompts immediate use of 
our word “because”, although the thought may be unspoken. Important too are 
ideas to do with purpose. Again, whether or not somebody may properly be said 
to have a particular purpose is part of the factual context. The way in which 
purpose is important is in predicting or foreshadowing behaviour. Most ob-
viously if the other person seeks to be helpful that will likely prove more useful 
in one achieving one’s objective than if he or she has ulterior motives. The word 
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“motive” just used is part of an elaborate vocabulary connected to the idea of 
purpose. Notions of cause and effect together with that of purpose relate also to 
the idea of “blame”. We blame or shame people partly so as to shape their future 
behaviour.  
In this type of account certain “traps” are to be avoided. It is absolutely not 
the case that the world in the sense used here is to be construed as “whatever 
human beings say it is”. Readily available in ordinary language usage is the dis-
tinction between “what everybody believes” and “what is the case” and, yes, it 
may indeed be the case that the Earth is a sphere/geoid although everyone be-
lieves it to be flat. Also seductive is the suggestion that humans “interpret” the 
world in a variety of ways, so—it might be suggested—these interpretations 
warrant inclusion on the same basis as objects answering to more mundane de-
scriptions. What, for instance, about an animal or rock considered a god? Does 
the world now include cats, dogs and gods? The reply must be that people are 
free to interpret in all manner of ways, but one is concerned here with the con-
stituents of a world of objects. Another way of putting it is that the human body 
is a foundational part of the latter world and other elements of that world have 
the same existential status as it does. 
This links to the fundamental conceptual point that the physical world varies 
continuously: a related way of putting it is to say that a physical object could 
conceivably occupy any position in it. (This particular conception is modified in 
modern physics.) One may briefly situate other phenomena. No, a rainbow is 
not a physical object, but its location is with respect to an observer. With regard 
to the sea, its position/direction may be given by reference to objects; water also 
competes with objects for space and takes some lifting. With regard to the sun, 
moon and so on, ab initio these might have a status somewhat similar to, but less 
ephemeral than, the rainbow. However, bearing in mind the key point regarding 
continuous variation, on the basis of observation of terrestrial objects combined 
with observation of the heavens (particularly crucial at an early stage being 
naked-eye observation of the moon’s phases and of eclipses) what might simply 
have been viewed as “lights in the sky” is conceptualised as physical objects. It is 
highly indicative that the advance of science has had the largest single impact on 
our modern linguistic resources: according to the linguist David Crystal it may 
be judged that over half the words in the English language are scientific terms.  
Importantly, the resources of our language equip us to understand fully that 
other people may deceive in word and action. A person may tell the truth or lie; 
a person may do something or pretend to do it. Human beings are able to act (as 
on the stage); we can all do this at least to a rudimentary extent. A way of putting 
this is to say that for every primary way of behaving there is a secondary way. 
We can indicate the intention to do something while not intending to do it. 
What is evident is that the secondary way of acting only exists because of the 
primary one; it is parasitical upon it. 
In proceeding further an objective is to evaluate the usefulness of the frame-
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work presented. It may be that it can make the treatment of particular philo-
sophical issues more systematic or succinct. The way it is set up assigns a central 
position to language, within which context one may distinguish differing lan-
guage styles in practical and reflective contexts, but there is no reason to expect 
that these are sharply demarcated. The framework may serve to sensitise one to 
the importance of particular concepts or dichotomies; even the relations of dif-
fering “language games”. The hope is that it may contribute to structuring a 
philosophical approach. The extent to which it may do so should become clearer 
from consideration of selected examples of philosophical issues. 
6. Philosophical Issues 
6.1. Do Other People Really Feel Pain? 
It is being asked what reason is there for believing that other people feel pain as 
opposed merely to expressing it by such behaviour as wincing or through report. 
Crucially, it may be said that the reality of feeling pain (as opposed to its manife-
stations) is reflected in ordinary language usage which usage pre-dates any puta-
tive instances of pain under consideration. Furthermore, one may make the fol-
lowing observations in one’s own case. My own experience of pain and its vari-
ous manifestations accords with ordinary language usage. For instance, I perso-
nally feel minor pain occasionally which may or may not be expressed publicly; I 
have also felt major pain in ways apparent to onlookers. In sum, my experience 
accords with ordinary English usage; therefore I have no inclination to challenge 
it. So apparently is this the case for virtually everyone else. Hence no challenge is 
mounted to ordinary linguistic usage, which will therefore continue to be em-
ployed.  
There are of course also rare instances of people who do not feel pain at all but 
the fact that that condition can be identified and described demonstrates the 
value of the way ordinary language is deployed rather than serving to undermine 
it. Put sharply, those who do feel pain and those who do not may be distin-
guished. We all also know we can dissemble—pretend to be in pain: that possi-
bility too is acknowledged in language. From this example it is apparent that it is 
language usage which has primacy—in giving definition to an “internal” phe-
nomenon which may or may not have manifestations. Importantly, instances of 
that internal phenomenon are not “in need of external criteria” to be said to ex-
ist.  
6.2. Are There “Other Minds”? 
Philosophical discussion occasionally gets things “the wrong way up”. In the 
consideration of how we know about “other minds” it sometimes seems as 
though, from a position of existential “loneliness”, one is (rather desperately!) 
trying to “infer” that others also have a mental life, feel pain and so on. Against 
this, the “direction of travel” should be from what is shared through to the under-
standing of individual experience. Using shared linguistic resources one comes to 
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understand what it means for others to have their own mental lives, while un-
derstanding one has one oneself. Again, experience does not lead to a challenge 
being mounted to ordinary linguistic usage. 
The fact that a single word “mind” is used rather invites the suggestion that at 
some level there is integration, but one must identify the level. True, there are 
instances of pains, thoughts, and memory recall, but are these integrated into a 
whole? Certainly there are links. For instance, one can have the thought that ear-
lier one had a pain, but other thoughts may not connect to it at all. Thinking is 
understood to occupy time and thoughts to be distributed in time; there can be 
“reference back”; there can be repetitive, even obsessive patterns; but this merely 
establishes links. We also understand that people can do mental arithmetic as well 
as deliberate on a topic; these activities take rather more time. In and of themselves 
the various subjective elements are not tightly integrated into a whole. On the 
other hand, a pain is often felt to be located—as with toothache—which points 
more towards the significance of bodily form. 
In the quest for something resembling “subjective” integration, typically a lot 
of weight is put on memory—which is plainly absolutely vital in the survival of 
the organism. The content of memory is prima facie evidence of something—to 
oneself directly and to others as communicated; but it is not self-validating: va-
lidation has more to do with processes that are public. To illustrate the kind of 
role memory plays, perhaps I may be forgiven for being personal. I have memo-
ries of such remarks as, “Is it raining up there?” On the other hand, it is com-
mon knowledge in my circle that I am indeed a very tall person. That is the kind 
of way subjective memory recall and external reality connect up. Essentially 
there is integration centred on the wider concept of a person; with persons dif-
ferentiated by their bodies. The concept of a person entails that “my mind” gains 
something by way of location through its association with “my body”; both are 
understood by me in the same way as they are understood by anyone else, but 
with the difference that I know more in detail about the subjective side—which 
point is readily understood by all.  
Discussion not infrequently gets muddled because people confuse mental 
events with other “psychological-sounding” aspects of people such as their atti-
tudes and beliefs. A belief is not to be construed as a mental event although it 
may be expressed in a thought; significantly, that someone believes something 
persists in extended time in a way that thoughts as such do not. The point is that 
fundamental to the idea of belief is action tendency (A woman believes Brexit is 
a bad idea: she challenges others and argues with the television). Associated with 
this, there are seeming oddities in our use of the idea. If my wife hands me a cup 
of tea and I start drinking from it, it could be said of me that “I believe that the 
cup is not poisoned”, yet the notion that “this cup of tea is not poisoned” may 
never have “entered my head” at all. As indicated earlier, there is no intention 
here to give exhaustive treatment of a large topic (see Ryle, 2009; Strawson, 
1974). 
R. Startup 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2019.94028 462 Open Journal of Philosophy 
 
6.3. Do I Alone Exist? 
Some of the foregoing discussion goes over but more can be said about the use of 
“I”. As stressed above the use of that word is conventional i.e. defined within a 
language community. Pedantically, one could say I am a “ratified I-user” but so 
are there necessarily other ratified “I-users”. From a linguistic point of view all 
are equally situated. As above, the contents of my mental life have no intrinsic 
location, although their content is likely to be differentially concerned with what 
is understood to be “me”, meaning an identifiable person; for many purposes 
recall is important as evidence. The ratification of me as an “I-user” is logically 
on all fours with the ratification of the other “I-users”. On the other hand, it is 
shared language and understanding of the world which would enable me to 
identify the—rather special—state of affairs (perhaps following a nuclear holo-
caust) where I was the last man/woman standing.  
6.4. Is Our Knowledge of the World Acquired via Sense Data? 
The perspective developed here bears upon the adequacy of the “sense data” no-
tion deployed in some empiricist accounts. There may be an attempt to under-
stand how an (again lonely seeming!) individual acquires knowledge of “the ex-
ternal world” via “sense data”. Again, this is getting things the “wrong way up”. 
Knowledge has that status in relation to the wider language-using community. 
With the exception of subjective states, no-one is prevented by the general con-
ditions of inquiry from gaining the increment of knowledge for himself/herself 
(In modern conditions this may involve use of an instrument). There is shared 
understanding of our world. However, crucially, the one thing we cannot do 
collectively is touch it, see it, hear it, smell it, taste it. Furthermore, we are un-
derstood to be, as individuals, seeing, touching and hearing not “sense data” but 
food, music, a cat and so on. Increments in knowledge are initially acquired 
through individual observation; if necessary, people then “compare notes”. 
The “sense data theory” is often launched on the basis of the assertion that we 
can sometimes be deceived. Crucially, however, that state of affairs and how it 
might be tackled are themselves treated in language. With regard to the “bent 
stick” in a glass of water, we say: 1) that we are seeing a stick and 2) that it seems 
bent or broken, but, nevertheless, is not bent or broken. This last is confirmed by 
touching and holding it. As stressed here, and against some empiricist accounts, 
touching rather than seeing is fundamental, although the evidence of the two 
senses connects up—most particularly in the respect that when two things touch 
the touching may simultaneously be observed. In addition, there is the under-
standing that the only route to additional information regarding the physical 
world is through the observations of individuals, who are substantially inter-
changeable.  
6.5. Can There Be a Private Language? 
As is customary one may proceed to consider a “Crusoe-like” situation. Suppose 
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a man of average bodily appearance, but unfamiliar dress, arrives on his own, in 
a space-ship from outer space. He tries to communicate orally but, not surpri-
singly, without much success, but he is compliant and allows himself to be in-
stalled in a conventional domestic setting with his own bedroom. In that setting 
he is even overheard seemingly “talking to himself”. He quickly learns to nego-
tiate the rooms of the house, attend meals, and so on. Furthermore he begins to 
grasp certain English words—such as “breakfast”—and seemingly utters sounds 
taken to be corresponding words in his own language; he builds towards uttering 
very short remarks in English. What may perhaps be said is that this man is a 
“candidate” for being someone with his own private language: after all, he may 
reasonably be thought to have a language and “think” in that language; he is also 
the sole known user of the language.  
Of course, for very good reasons, everyone responds by asking such questions 
as: What is his origin, his community; how did he acquire his language; what 
about his memory of his past life; how come he even tries to speak to us? Were 
almost any of these questions to be answered substantively his “candidacy” would 
immediately collapse. Nevertheless, ahead of that happening, a straight-batted re-
sponse is to say: But those are other questions and who knows what the answers 
may be; after all, he comes from outer space. Were question and answer to be 
“left there” there is a certain similarity to the following exchange within a dif-
ferent context: How is God able to communicate with people in English? An-
swer: Who knows? (God’s linguistic capacities do not, it seems, derive from par-
ticipation in a conventional language community).  
Language (like morality and the law) purchases on actual human experience. 
It also accretes to handle what are judged to be fundamentally new phenomena, 
such as technological innovations. Like morality and law, language usage may be 
characterised as “conservative” in that it tries to preserve existing practice where 
it can, which would be likely to apply here. In the absence of any real context for 
this man’s capacities, instead of talking about his private language, it might be 
said that, on his arrival, he lacked “true language” but has “self-linguistic ten-
dencies” of a previously unknown kind (This could even lead in the direction of 
saying that “he is not really a man”). In sum, there is very unlikely to be accep-
tance within the language community that it is appropriate to talk about some-
one having a private language. 
6.6. Geometry, Topology and Logic 
Arising out of the framework developed here the aim is to make a strategic (if 
esoteric) point concerning the relation between geometry and logic. The aim of 
Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica was to show that in some sig-
nificant sense mathematics is reducible to logic. To that end a substantial specia-
lised set of symbols was developed and put to use in its many definitions and 
theorems. The authors were only partially successful although their system proved 
able to handle number and elementary arithmetic. The question arises: could such 
a reduction of geometry be effected? The fact that Euclidean geometry is axi-
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omatised rather points in that direction (the system many of us are familiar with 
from school mathematics is a reworking of Euclid by the French mathematician 
Legendre in the nineteenth century). Significant too is the point that number 
may be interpreted geometrically and geometry is integrated with arithmetic and 
algebra in analytical geometry. Hence there are some signs pointing towards a re-
presentation of geometry in purely logical terms. The suggestion being made here, 
however, is that such a reduction would be likely to founder. 
It will be recalled that Euclidean geometry takes in both plane and solid geo-
metry; in addition, there is no problem in respect of the algebraic representation 
of figures of any dimension (including, for instance, the four dimensions of rela-
tivity). In both cases, however, the notion of dimensionality is taken as “a given”. 
In the twentieth century a more precise definition of the concept of dimensio-
nality was forthcoming and it was also noted that an inductive definition of di-
mensionality is implicitly contained in Euclid’s Elements; that led on to the de-
velopment of an extensive theory of dimension (Courant & Robbins, 1958: pp. 
248-251). This important mathematical work in itself, however, does not point 
to the analysis of dimension in purely logical terms. In this connection, it may be 
that mathematical induction is not itself reducible to logic in this sense, whence 
its designation as “a principle”. Indeed it is critical that language may not assist 
in this project since, although it lends itself both to differentiation of objects in 
the world and of linguistic items (such as words) which may contribute to a re-
duction of number to logic, it offers no comparable resources which could effect 
a reduction of dimension to logic. The notion one is rather left with, therefore, is 
that dimensionality has its primary source in the facticity of the physical world, 
encountered as “a world of objects”. The deeper implication may be that the 
conditions for a limited reduction to logic as was partially effected for number 
and arithmetic are lacking.  
6.7. Are There Human Rights? 
In the modern era it would be taken as a “given” that people have rights: one is 
again in the realm of the “taken for granted”. Consider the question: “Do indi-
viduals have arms, legs, rights and responsibilities?” This could be answered 
summarily in the affirmative, but most would sense that something odd is going 
on; an unease which connects to the idea of a “category mistake”. To sort this 
out attention needs to be directed at language and exigencies. 
When one reflects on it, it can seem a minor—or even a major—“miracle” 
that humans now live together in their billions on this planet, without there 
breaking out a “war of all against all”—to evoke the Hobbesian scarecrow image. 
We all have our individual aims in life—and often act without even knowing 
other’s aims—so it seems we are bound to collide. The explanation of course is 
the institutionalisation of rules in the form of the law, morality, even rules of 
good manners. Very importantly, two distinguishable elements are involved, 
with links to the earlier distinction between the public and the private. On the 
one hand, there are agencies of social control in the conditions/circumstances of 
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action of all of us, such as the police and law courts. That alone would never be 
enough to produce relative orderliness. The other element is that individual 
people themselves have been changed, so that they may be said to have “interna-
lised” rules and norms: an individual person may understand and contemplate a 
rule and also adhere to it. Some aspects of social control are public but others are 
mediated through subjective experience.  
That the paramount need is to maintain order is fundamental. As a conse-
quence the language of rights and morality has to an extent assimilated itself into 
the language concerning “what is the case”; whence the similar form of “humans 
have arms and legs” and “humans have rights and responsibilities”. Jeremy Ben-
tham challenged the idea saying, “natural rights is simply nonsense…nonsense 
upon stilts”. He objected to the way that in the context of the French Revolution 
the notion of rights, “assumes its substantive shape, and joining itself to a band 
of suitable associates, sets up the banner of insurrection, anarchy, and lawless vi-
olence” (quoted in a similar context by Blackburn, 2009: p. 178). At least it will 
be agreed that the French Revolution was a time of “exigency”. Bentham un-
derstood the notion of rhetoric and sensed that he was confronted by something 
being fast endowed with “object-like” qualities. 
7. Some Key Points Arising 
The first three philosophical issues are conceptually linked. I can only come to 
identify that I am in pain, or have a mind or am a person, using linguistic re-
sources shared within the community. One only comes to identify the state of 
being in pain in oneself while recognising that the same may hold for other 
people; one only comes to view oneself as having thoughts and a mind while 
coming to attribute these aspects to other people. Hence the primary notion is 
that of a person of which I am one. As indicated earlier, we are individuated as 
people within the world of objects. 
In respect of the sense data theory of our knowledge of the world, it is unclear 
how sense data deriving from differing senses, e.g. “seeing sense data” and 
“touching sense data”, could be integrated simply from their intrinsic nature; 
nor is it clear how any such data could yield what is to be understood as know-
ledge without confirmation by reference to more than one human subject. Once 
one understands human beings as belonging to a world of objects, the sense or-
gans are identified and their joint operation understood. The sense data theory 
can only even be approximately understood while the world of objects is taken 
for granted. The only way to unravel the confusion in the first four philosophical 
issues is to focus explicitly on that world. 
The fifth issue above, concerning a private language, hinges on our reluctance 
to classify any linguistic-seeming phenomenon which lacks a social-communicative 
character as language. Hence it draws attention to the continuity of linguistic 
practice within a community, which implies in-built conservatism (cf Occam’s 
Razor, the principle that entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity). 
Hence the crux of the issue is the continuity of language. 
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To draw out the significance of the sixth philosophical issue treated above, one 
may note in passing, but not be unduly distracted by, a particularly straightfor-
ward point. Of course it is the case that geometry has its historical roots in men-
suration, but the philosophical treatment considered here has a different focus. 
The point is that that treatment seems to be firmly of a logical/mathematical 
type, but, if the account given here has validity, the issue concerning dimensio-
nality cannot be detached from the given nature of the “world of objects”. 
The final philosophical issue belongs to moral philosophy and emphatically 
concerns the exigencies of life. The language of human rights contributes to the 
avoidance of a Hobbesian war of all against all. A rhetorical purpose is served by 
endowing rights with “object-like” qualities. Linguistically, rights are being pre-
sented as sharing in the unchallengeable—and taken for granted—reality of ob-
jects in the world. Hence, philosophical clarification is needed of the impact of 
exigency on the continuity of language. 
8. Conclusion 
The earlier sections of this article successively focus firstly on language, then on 
“what is the case” including logic, mathematics and the empirical sphere; then 
on the continuity of language including the understanding that we inhabit a 
world of objects, and, finally, the exigencies which shape life and language. The 
value of a systematic treatment is evident from consideration of the seven philo-
sophical issues. The first four issues are appropriately sorted out by analysis of 
“what is the case” in terms of a physical world with human beings in it; in a nar-
rower way this even arises in respect of the issue concerning dimensionality in 
geometry. Consideration of the topic of a private language draws attention to the 
need to focus on the continuity of language. Finally, the topic from moral phi-
losophy requires analysis of the impact of exigency on the continuity of lan-
guage. In an identifiable sense progress may be made in each case by making the 
explicit focus aspects which were previously implicit or taken for granted. 
The project of this paper to delineate a structure for the “taken for granted” 
and to illustrate its usefulness has thus to a degree been realised, but it is partial 
in two respects. The first way in which it is partial is that the types of philosoph-
ical issues used as illustrations are somewhat of a kind; they tend to be (some-
times relatively well-worn) topics raised within what may be characterised as the 
logical empiricist tradition. I have tried to select for “band-width”—including, 
for instance, moral philosophy and a mathematical/logical issue—but the net has 
not been spread that widely. The second is that one may be left wondering just 
how much of the earlier detail is actually used in tackling the issues. Perhaps the 
most that may be claimed is that the approach makes the treatment of disparate 
philosophical topics more systematic; it also serves to orient thinking, even func-
tion as an aide memoire, which may be an indication of promise. 
One is also sensitised to the “grammar” involved as various dichotomies are 
deployed such as those between the subjective and objective and between the 
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public and private. So too, is one’s attention directed at indexical uses of lan-
guage especially the use of “I”, on the one hand, and impersonal uses on the 
other. Importantly, one is led strategically to deploy the notion of continuity in 
two very different contexts: spatial occupancy and linguistic development. These 
distinctions alone imply a structuring of inquiry with language assigned prima-
cy. 
A further important dichotomy is basic to empiricism and concerns, on the 
one hand, the empirical, contingent or putative “external world” and, on the 
other, human observation (in the broadest sense) leading to knowledge of it. 
Importantly, what is observed and the occurrence of acts of observation are 
equally publicly accessible. In this connection, however, the idea of one observa-
tion “confirming” another so that we thereby gain knowledge of “what is the 
case” is crucial. The point is that linguistic communication is fundamental to 
any confirmatory process. It is of the essence, that all communication among 
humans has the same kind of public facticity as does the subject about which 
they are communicating. It is sometimes commented that communication is 
“meaningful” as though this complicates matters essentially. The response is to 
say that it can be as meaningful as you like but it is nevertheless physically me-
diated e.g. conversation is mediated through sound waves passing through the 
atmosphere. The public nature of process at all stages relates logically to the 
public nature of the product. 
At more than one point in this account an important part has been played by 
the distinction between primary and secondary phenomena. Thus humans can 
do or feel innumerable things but also pretend to do or feel them; they can, as we 
say, lie in word or action. Seemingly, direct observation presents the “illusion” of 
a straight stick becoming bent in water, but further observations confirm that 
the stick has not become bent. In a rather different way humans may be judged 
to be pretty “uncertain” of almost everything but a second-order certainty is that 
they rely on knowing many things in conventional terms. Once there is under-
standing of how ordinary language negotiates its way round the primary and 
secondary “landscape”—which it does without pausing for breath—the asso-
ciated philosophical problems tend to “dissolve”; probably meeting with Witt-
genstein’s approval. 
Language games are distinct—until they are not distinct. It would be a com-
monplace observation to say that the language of rhetoric “works in quite dif-
ferent ways” from that of science; that is until there is reference to both “natural 
rights” and the “natural world”. Morality, the law and politics have, as it were, 
“called in aid” language directed at “what is the case”. The underlying reason is 
the paramount need to legitimate certain ways of acting; so as powerfully to as-
sist orderly goal achievement in a context of exigencies. While participating in a 
sociological study of the church I heard a member of the laity say, “God is not 
lonely, he has angels for company”. This has the same form as, “I am not lonely, 
I have my wife for company”. There is evidently a need for a second-order study 
of how differing language games “borrow” participants and pieces in play. 
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Shortly above is a section concerned with arguing that the kind of reduction of 
elements of mathematics to logic effected by Whitehead and Russell may not be 
possible for the key geometrical notion of dimension. Following on from this, 
the broader question is raised: how is the division in mathematics to be made 
between those parts susceptible of reduction to logic and those not so suscepti-
ble? If there is such a demarcation, how is it to be accounted for? One is drawn 
to this line of inquiry but, this time, it would probably not attract Wittgenstein’s 
approval.  
It must be acknowledged that at the end of the day the overall thrust of this 
account is in a certain sense realist. It is hoped that it has taken to heart at least 
one or two significant points from both Wittgenstein’s earlier and later philoso-
phies (Wittgenstein, 1997); that it draws both from his insights on the logical 
structure of propositions while doing more than curtsying towards scrutiny of 
everyday uses of language. A further dichotomy is between practical activity 
geared to survival and reflection on it. Reflection must be deeply informed by an 
understanding of practical activity, while recognising that their linguistic com-
ponents are integrated within a single linguistic universe.  
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